This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equilibria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 × 2 case, both imitation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
The interpretation of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria is an important problem in Game Theory. The first difficulty lies on the meaning of mixed strategy and whether it is reasonable or not to assume that players randomize between pure strategies with precise probabilities. The second is the issue of indifference. In mixed-strategy equilibria, the players are always indifferent between the mixed strategy they are playing and any of the pure strategies in its support (and actually any other mixed strategy with the same support). While it is true that they have no incentives to deviate, they have no incentives to remain with the same action either.
Many alternative interpretations of such "mixed equilibria" have been proposed. Building on an early suggestion from John Nash [12, pp.32-33] , evolutionary game theory has attempted to solve the first difficulty through what could be labeled "the population approach." In the framework of a dynamical system, it is postulated that there is an infinite population of players for each position in the game, and that they are repeatedly randomly matched to play the game. A Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies) of the game can be re-interpreted as a giving the proportions of players in each population who play each of the pure strategies available to them.
The second problem, though, becomes specially obvious when dynamic interpretations are postulated, i.e. when Nash equilibria are viewed as rest points of suitable dynamics. Any reasonable dynamic model would have to allow the agents to try out all the alternatives if they are truly indifferent, and hence it is difficult to see in which sense would a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium be a rest point.
It is often argued that, in a population framework, the population approach is formally equivalent to a situation where all the agents in the population actually play a mixed strategy. 1 However, under both interpretations, the fact remains that every agent is actually indifferent between the strategy he is playing and any pure strategy in the support of the mixed strategy: both would give the same payoff, provided play in the other populations do not change (myopia). Hence, it remains unclear why would any dynamics based on, e.g., myopic best reply select Nash equilibria. Hofbauer [8] rigorously explores this question in the case of the Best Reply continuous-time dynamics for a large population of agents. In a finite population, though, such "indifference" might make the stability of Nash equilibria strongly dependent of the modeling details, and, specifically, of tie-breaking assumptions.
Rather than trying to give a single interpretation for all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, this work focuses on symmetric games. A natural framework for a dynamic analysis of such games is given not by a multi-population context, but by a single-population one. In such a framework, several models have been proposed in the literature which deal with an explicitly finite population of boundedly rational agents who use behavioral rules based on imitation or best reply. Interaction is not necessarily limited to random matching ( [14] ), but encompasses also round-robin tournaments ( [9, 10] ) and general N -player games ( [15, 5] ). This paper is specially related to Kandori et al [9] and Oechssler [13] . Kandori et al [9] study a model where agents imitate highest payoffs when playing a 2 × 2 game among themselves. In the case where the game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium but no pure-strategy, symmetric ones, they find that the (potentially high) speed of adjustment of their model makes the mixed profile unstable. Then they make an additional assumption, not on individual behavior but directly on the dynamics (a "contraction" relative to the mixed profile) to stabilize it.
Oechssler [13] studies a similar framework (which he calls "the small population case") for best reply, but makes the explicit assumption that, whenever there are several alternative best replies, agents which are already playing one will never change. He then concentrates on convergence issues for games with n ≤ 3 strategies. This paper is an attempt to explore why, and if so, when are symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibria "stable" in a dynamic context and a finite population, specially when agents are allowed to try all alternatives that they perceive as equally worthwhile.
The first, trivial observation is that, contrary to the multi-population approach, the two "population interpretations" mentioned above are not equivalent. If we consider a population of agents, all of them playing the same mixed strategy, any one of them will remain indifferent between the pure strategies in the support of the mixed one. If the mixed strategy is interpreted as a population profile giving the proportion of agents playing each of the pure strategies in a game, then things change. If an agent changes his strategy, his action would change the population proportions and hence affect his own payoff. Or, to put it in a simpler way, the fact that an agent does not play against himself makes a difference between the population proportions and the profile of strategies that he faces. Thus, it is possible that keeping his current strategy is a strict best response to the situation given by the underlying game and the population framework. Hence, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium might be interpreted as a population profile where agents actually play pure strategies, and they remain with them because they actually give larger payoffs than any other alternative.
Once this observation is done, it turns out that several different dynamic approaches are able to sustain population profiles corresponding to mixedstrategy Nash equilibria as stable outcomes or rest points. Specifically, dynamics based on (myopic) best reply and imitation are considered. The importance (or lack of it) of the specific assumptions in the model at hand is illustrated considering both the slow adjustment case (as in [6] ) and the quick adjustment one (as in [9] ).
First, the simplest case (2 × 2 games) is analyzed. It is shown that mixed equilibria can be sustained by finite population dynamics when the game has no pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibria. The exact meaning of "stability" takes different forms in the case of myopic best reply and imitation, but the qualitative features of both models turn out to be essentially identical. Under myopic best reply, the process converges to an absorbing state (i.e. a singleton recurrent communication classes) which either corresponds exactly to the mixed equilibrium or to a state next to it (depending on integer problems). Under imitation (and slow speed of adjustment), the system settles in a narrow (but non-singleton) recurrent communication class centered around a state whose population proportions approach the mixed equilibrium as the population size grows to infinity. Second, we investigate to which extent these encouraging results extend to the general case. Under myopic best reply, we ask which mixed Nash equilibria will be absorbing states even as the population size grows, and identify a refinement of Nash equilibrium which is unrelated to previous (evolutionary) concepts. We call the associated strategies BR-focal.
Under imitation, the analogous attempt results in a different refinement, which we call Imitation-focal strategies.
We find that both concepts coincide for 2 × 2 games. For more general games, Imitation-focal strategies with full support are BR-focal, but the implication fails if the strategy is not completely mixed. 
THE BASIC MODEL
= {(n 1 , ..., n m ) ∈ N m / n 1 + ... + n m = N }.
Notation.
A typical state is denoted by ω, with ω(s) denoting its sth coordinate, i.e. the number of agents playing s in the state ω. We call supp(ω) = {s ∈ S / ω(s) > 0}. We also keep the standard notation supp(σ) for the strategies in the support of a given mixed-strategy σ.
Each period, each player interacts with all the other agents (round robin tournament). Hence, the payoff of an agent playing strategy s when the population state is ω is given by
The last term (−π(s, s)) takes care of the fact that an agent will not play against himself. Alternatively, this can be reinterpreted as the expected payoff (times N ) when agents are randomly matched in pairs to play the game, with uniform probabilities. It is immaterial which interpretation is taken, as long as agents take decisions according to Π(s, ω).
How agents learn
After play takes place, some agents will have the opportunity to update their strategies. We call this updating "learning." Whenever an agent is called to learn, he does so according to a behavioral rule Definition 2.1.
A Behavioral Rule for agent i is a mapping B i : S × Ω −→ ∆(S) where ∆(S) is the set of probability measures over pure strategies. B i (s, ω)(s ) is then the probability with which agent i will play strategy s after playing strategy s when the population state was ω. This definition (potentially) incorporates the following elements:
• Myopia. Agents rely only on experience (B i depends on current play), and do not perform calculations about what other agents are going to do.
• Social Learning. Agents learn from their own actions but also from the actions of others, since B i also depends on ω.
• Bounded Memory. Agents' decisions are influenced only by the last period. See [3] for a discussion of models with longer memory.
• Probabilistic. Agents may display partially random behavior. This will be specially important e.g. to incorporate tie-breaking assumptions.
• Anonymity Rules cannot depend on the names of other agents. This is formalized through the use of the (summarized) state space Ω.
We consider two focal behavioral rules: imitation and myopic best reply.
Definition 2.2.

The behavioral rule
That is, a rule is imitative if it prescribes to imitate the strategy that has given larger payoffs (any of them in case of ties).
Notation.
Let ω be an state and let s ∈ supp(ω).
m(ω, s, s ) is the state that an agent playing s thinks that he would induce in the population if he would change his strategy from s to s , while everybody else kept his strategy.
Definition 2.3.
The behavioral rule B i is a myopic best reply if
That is, the agent computes his best reply to the current strategy profile, (myopically) assuming that no other agents will change their strategy.
It is worth emphasizing the differences between imitation and best reply in the current framework. Imitation requires extremely low computational capabilities, and absolutely no knowledge of the game. Agents merely use the information about the correspondence between actually played strategies and actually observed payoffs. Myopic best reply, on the other hand, requires potentially complex computations and explicit knowledge of the game (payoff function). Agents compare potential, unobserved payoffs that would result from a change in the current situation. In this sense, imitation and myopic best reply represent two extreme, opposite behavioral assumptions. Imitation requires an extremely low degree of rationality. Myopic best reply requires relatively high rationality.
In the present context, however, both rules produce the same results if the population is large enough, at least in states where all strategies are present. Since the round-robin tournament induces a continuous function of the stage model payoffs, if the population is (very) large, the payoffs in the state ω and m(ω, s, s ) are arbitrarily close. Hence, there is some confusion in the literature as to whether one model is to be interpreted as imitation or best reply. Technically, a model with imitative behavioral rules is similar to a model with best reply where agents do not take into account the fact that they cannot meet themselves. In the case of a large population, the distinction turns irrelevant.
We will keep a sharp and clear distinction between imitation and best reply, for two reasons. First, we are interested in explicitly finite populations. Second, there is a big conceptual difference between imitation and (myopic) best reply in terms of the degree of rationality they assume.
Further, note that the two rules above incorporate the following Assumption 1. Whenever a behavioral rule specifies several possible best strategies, the agent chooses all of them with strictly positive probability, without exception.
This assumption is conceptually very important. For instance, one might assume that, under myopic best reply, agents already playing a best reply to the current profile do not change strategies even if there are other best replies available, because they have no incentive to deviate. We explicitly depart from such assumptions because they would prevent us from tackling the original problem. The position of this paper is that, if there are several available best replies, an agent has no incentive not to deviate, and drift will eventually appear.
When agents learn
The concept of inertia is standard in learning models. It is assumed that not all agents are able to learn all periods. This is introduced in different ways in different models. Kandori et al [9] argue that inertia is a justification for myopia. 4 In their model, though, the probability of being able to learn is independent across agents. In other models, it is often argued that, if the population is large, it is unrealistic to assume that all agents are able to revise their strategies simultaneously. As an extreme assumption, it is postulated that the probability of two agents learning simultaneously is zero, which gives rise to models where, each period, only one randomly sampled agent is able to revise his strategy.
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In all cases, though, it is always assumed that the probability of a given agent being able to revise in a given period is positive. This is merely an anonymity requirement, and does not imply that the dynamics must allow for simultaneous revisions as in [3] . As in [6] , it is allowed that only one agent revises each period, provided that any one of them may, potentially, be the chosen one. Symmetrically, it is assumed that no agent has the guarantee of always being able to revise. We explicitly make this assumption:
Assumption 2. For all t, and for each i = 1, ..., N , the probability that agent i is able to revise at period t is strictly positive and less than one (although not necessarily independent from that of other agents).
With this caveat, we explicitly distinguish between the two approaches mentioned above.
Definition 2.4.
We say that a model presents independent inertia λ if, every period, each agent is able to revise his strategy with probability 0 < 1 − λ < 1, independent across agents and across periods.
We say that a model presents non-simultaneous learning if, every period, a single agent is randomly sampled and this agent is the only one able to revise his strategy.
The interest of these two alternative formulations lies on their relationship to the speed of adjustment of the postulated dynamics. A model with independent inertia could be described as one of quick adjustment. Each period, all the agents in a fraction of the population (which can be close to one) are able to simultaneously revise their strategies. If we were to think of large populations or short time periods, this implies a large number of revisions per time unit. On the other hand, models with non-simultaneous learning have slow adjustment. Only one agent revises at a time, and, in N periods, always N agents would have revised their strategies. 6 
Learning processes
We are now able to consider different models. We call (single-population) Learning Process any model where:
• Interaction: A single finite population of N agents, i = 1, ..., N interacting in discrete time, t = 1, 2, ... to play an underlying finite, symmetric two-player game according to a round-robin tournament (or, alternatively, random matching with evaluation of expected payoffs).
• Speed of Adjustment: Each period, there is a specification of when are agents able to learn (e.g. independent inertia or non-simultaneous learning). This specification does not depend on the time index, and ex ante the probability of a given agent being able to revise in a given period is strictly positive and less than one.
• Learning: When an agent is able to learn, it does so according to a pre-specified behavioral rule (e.g. imitation or myopic best reply). In case of indifference between several options, he chooses all of them with positive probability.
Note that any such Learning Process defines a finite Markov Chain on the state space Ω, and hence can be studied using the standard techniques from the theory of stochastic processes (see e.g. [11] ).
The dynamics induces probabilities of transition among states which we denote P (ω, ω ). The matrix P of transition probabilities is called transition matrix of the process. We also denote P k (ω, ω ) the probability that the process is at state ω given that k periods before it was at state ω.
Given a stochastic process with transition matrix P and finite state space Ω, we say that two states ω, ω communicate if there exist t, t > 0 such that P t (ω, ω ) > 0 and P t (ω , ω) > 0. This defines an equivalence relation whose equivalence classes are called communication classes. Qualitatively, all states in the same communication class share the same features. For example, the process cannot eventually settle in a strict subset of a communication class, but rather on a full class.
A communication class C is transient if there exist ω ∈ C, ω ∈ Ω\C such that P (ω, ω ) > 0. Classes which are not transient are called recurrent. The process will eventually leave all transient classes and settle in a recurrent class. If there is just one recurrent class, the process is called it ergodic; if there are more than one, the process exhibits path dependence, i.e., it might settle down in different classes depending on the initial conditions. Definition 2.5.
Consider a learning process with transition matrix P . A population state ω is called absorbing if P (ω, ω) = 1.
An absorbing state forms a singleton recurrent communication class. Once the process gets to an absorbing state, it will never leave it. This is the first condition we will be interested in. Absorbing states are analogous to stationary states of deterministic dynamics.
The basin of attraction B(C) of a recurrent class C is the set of states from which there are positive probability paths that reach C in finite time,
Abusing notation, we also speak of the basin of attraction of an absorbing state, B(ω) = B({ω}). Let (σ, 1 − σ) be the mixed strategy which gives the Nash equilibrium, and let n * = σ · N , i.e. the population proportion that corresponds to σ if the mixed strategy is to be interpreted in population terms.
THE 2 × 2 CASE
If his opponent is playing the mixed strategy (σ, 1 − σ), a player is indifferent between playing A and B, i.e.
For σ to be readily interpreted as a population profile, n * should be an integer. As we will see, the analysis varies (slightly) depending on whether it is or not. For easy reference, we give a name to this condition (but do not assume it).
Condition (INT). n
Consider a population state ω where exactly n * agents are playing strategy A and N − n * agents play B. This population profile corresponds to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Denote Π(s, n) the payoff of an agent playing strategy s = A, B when exactly n agents in the population are playing A. It follows that
Consider any learning process applied to the described game. The state space can be summarized by {0, 1, 2, ..., N }, where state n is identified with all the situations where exactly n agents play strategy A. Under (INT), the symmetric Nash Equilibrium corresponds then to state n * .
Myopic Best Reply
Suppose the learning process is based on myopic best reply. An agent playing A would remain with his current action if
i.e. if the payoff of playing A when there are n agents in the population playing A (including himself) is larger than the payoff he would obtain if he were to switch to B, facing then a state where n − 1 agents would play A. Analogously, an agent playing B would remain with his action if
Ties are broken randomly, i.e. we want to explicitly allow all possibilities whenever an agent faces an indifference situation (Assumption 1).
Proposition 3.1. Consider the 2 × 2 game above, and assume (INT). In any learning process with myopic best reply, the state n * corresponding to the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium is absorbing if and only if c > a and b > d, i.e. neither (A,A) nor (B,B) are Nash Equilibria.
Hence, an agent playing A will keep his action with probability one if and only if c > a. Analogously, It is worth noticing that in state n * , agents do not remain with their current actions because they are indifferent. Quite on the contrary, they do so because their current actions are strictly better than the alternative. Of course, if payoffs are averaged across interactions or re-interpreted as expected payoffs in a random matching framework, the advantage of keeping the current action (e.g.
b−a N −1 ) tends to zero as the population size grows to infinity, but for any fixed N it is still positive. This provides a tempting interpretation for symmetric mixed strategy equilibria at the population level.
Example 3.1.
Consider a learning process with independent inertia and myopic best reply. This dynamics is similar to the one in Kandori et al [9] , with the difference that there agents imitated the action which led to the highest payoffs instead of playing a best reply.
Assume (INT). Consider the state n * , and suppose c < a, b < d (e.g. a Coordination game). On state n * , all agents will change their current actions if they get the opportunity to revise. Although it could happen that just two agents get revision opportunities and they exchange their strategies, the probability of remaining in state n * is strictly less than one. Hence n * is not absorbing. 
Proposition 3.2. Consider the 2 × 2 game above with c > a, b > d. In any learning process with myopic best reply, there exists n
which is decreasing in n, and equal to zero if and only if
Hence, for n > n A , A-players which are given the opportunity to revise switch to B with probability one. Analogously,
which is increasing in n, and equal to zero if and only if
It follows that, given opportunity, B-players switch to A whenever n < n B .
On any state n such that n B < n * < n A , all agents will keep their current actions regardless of whether they get the opportunity to revise or not. Hence n is absorbing.
Analogously, states out of C are in transient classes. Note that n A − n B = 1, i.e. C is a singleton unless n A is exactly an integer. In the first case, the result follows immediately. In the second case, under nonsimultaneous learning it suffices to observe that {n A − 1, n A } is recurrent. Under independent inertia, the fact that P (n B , N ) > 0, P (n A , 0) > 0 makes the process irreducible, i.e. the whole state space is a communication class and the process never settles down.
The proof is completed observing that the quotients n A /N and n B /N approach σ as N grows to infinity.
This result tells us that, essentially, under myopic best reply, in a 2 × 2 game without symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, the mixed strategy equilibrium is the essential prediction. This takes the form of a unique absorbing state which coincides with n * whenever n * is an integer, and is next to it when not. The case when n A is an integer for a given N (and hence n * is not) is merely an extreme form of an integer problem. It is interesting to observe that this result is independent of the inertia/speed of adjustment assumptions (except when n A is an integer). Only the speed of convergence might be affected by such details.
Remark 3. 1. Suppose the learning process of the previous Proposition presents independent inertia λ. Consider any state n. If n > n A , with positive probability n − n * A-agents are the ones getting opportunity to revise and they will switch to B, therefore the process reaches state n * . If n < n B = n A − 1, with positive probability n * − n B B-agents switch to A and the process reaches n * . If n B < n < n A , neither A-agents nor B-agents will change when given opportunity, hence the state n is absorbing.
Convergence, though, might be slow. The process might keep "overshooting" the set C for a long while, specially if n A , n B are close. Technically, the whole set Ω \ C forms a single transient communication class.
Assume instead non-simultaneous learning. For each state n > n A , there is probability 1 n that an A-player is given opportunity to revise, hence switching to B and moving the process to state n − 1. With the complementary probability, a B-player is given opportunity to revise, which he won't do, and hence the process remains in state n. Hence, the process moves inexorably towards C, without any overshooting possibility. Technically, each state in Ω \ C forms its own transient communication class.
Intuitively, under independent inertia (i.e. with a single, large transient class), convergence is slowed down by the exploding number of possibilities that appear because of simultaneous revisions, and the length of the "long-run" until the process hits C will grow exponentially with the size of the population. Under non-simultaneous learning (i.e. a large number of small transient classes), though, speed of convergence does not essentially depend on the size of the population, or, more precisely, since the number of possibilities from a given state does not depend on the population size, the expected time until C is reached grows linearly with N .
Imitation
Suppose now that the learning process is based on imitation. Automatically, the states n = 0 and n = N are absorbing, since if only one action is observed, no other action can be mimicked. In the "interior" of the state space, an agent playing A would remain with his current action if
i.e. if the payoff of playing A when there are n agents in the population playing A (including himself) is larger than the payoff other agents actually playing B have obtained. Analogously, an agent playing B would remain with his action if
Ties are broken randomly (recall Assumption 1). 
Proof.
Let 0 < n < N , i.e. both strategies are played in state n. If Π(A, n) < Π(B, n), A-players will imitate B, and hence the state is not absorbing. If Π(A, n) > Π(B, n), B-players will imitate A. If Π(A, n) = Π(B, n), neither A-players nor B-players have any imitationbased incentive to remain with their current action. Due to the random breaking of ties, it follows that P (n, n) < 1 and n can not be absorbing.
States 0 and N are trivially absorbing since an unobserved action can not be imitated.
Under imitation, only monomorphic states, i.e. states where all agents are playing the same strategy, can be absorbing. If two different strategies are present and they give different payoffs, then the one giving larger payoffs will be imitated. If they give exactly the same payoffs, then there is always positive probability that an agent drifts from one strategy to the other, hence drawing the process out of the state. It follows that indifference then blurs the intuitive difference between a Hawk and Dove game, where dynamics should lead "in the direction" of n * , and a Coordination game, where dynamics should lead "away" from n * . Proof. Take any state n. Then,
Hence, for n >n, A-players which are given the opportunity to revise switch to B with probability one, and, for n <n, B-players will be the ones switching. It follows that, if n >n, P (n, n) + P (n, n + 1) = 1, and, if n <n, P (n, n) + P (n, n − 1) = 1. Moreover, both probabilities in the sum are always positive, i.e. the process always moves in the direction ofn. Suppose first thatn is an integer. In staten, strategies A and B give the same payoff. Hence, if an A-player is given revision opportunity, he will either keep his strategy or switch to B, and conversely for a B-player. However, P (n − 1,n) = P (n + 1,n) = 1, i.e. the process will always return ton after one period.
It follows immediately that C is a recurrent class, and the basins of attraction of states 0 and N are empty. Since there are no other recurrent classes, the result follows.
Suppose now thatn is not an integer. In state n , if a B-player is given revision opportunity, he will switch to A and drive the process to state n . Conversely, from state n an A-player will switch to B and drive the process to n . It follows that C is a recurrent class and the process converges to C from any initial condition except 0 and N .
It remains to observe that lim N →∞n N = σ.
This result shows us that, under imitation and non-simultaneous learning, in a 2 × 2 game without symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, the mixed strategy equilibrium is again the essential prediction. This takes the form of a very narrow recurrent class aroundn, which converges to the appropriate proportion as N grows. This recurrent class fails to be a singleton merely because of either integer problems or exact indifference. Outside the set, there are two other absorbing states created by the very nature of imitation, which have empty basins of attraction.
e.n is pulled to one or the other side of n * by the payoffs of the symmetric, pure-strategy profiles.
What happens under independent inertia? Obviously, there are only two absorbing states, 0 and N , and the rest of states are in a single, large transient class. Intuitively, the speed of adjustment is too high and blurs the result. In actual simulations, though,n will still play a role, since the actual probabilities of transition still favour a trend towardsn. It is the existence of low but positive probabilities of transition, say, fromn to 0 or N which (apparently) destroys the result. Kandori et al [9] solve the problem by postulating a "contraction" of the dynamics relative to a a mixed profile, i.e. they explicitly assume that the distance to the reference mixed-strategy diminishes. This is an assumption made directly on the dynamics, which is difficult to trace back to individual behavior.
Extended Example: Hawk and Dove
Consider the well-known "Hawk and Dove" game:
where C > V > 0. This game has two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (H, D) and (D, H), and a single symmetric Nash equilibrium where both players play a mixed strategy which gives weight V /C to the strategy H (Hawk). Hence, in our notation, n * = (V /C) · N . Consider any learning process based on myopic best reply. We can apply Proposition 3.2. Direct computation shows that
Hence, from any initial condition the process converges to an absorbing state which lies between n D and n D + 1. If n * is an integer, then C = {n * }. If not, then C is the singleton formed by the closest state to n * , except in the extreme case when 2 · n * is exactly an integer and n * is not. Consider a learning process based on imitation and non-simultaneous learning. We can apply Proposition 3.4. Direct computation shows that
Hence, from any initial condition except 0 and N , the process converges to a recurrent class formed by the two closest states to n * + 1 (if n * is not an integer), or by the states n * , n * + 1, n * + 2 (if n * is an integer). Both results point to the significance of population profiles where (approximately) a fraction V /C of the population play strategy H, i.e., the profile which corresponds to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
Coordination Games: a Remark
Suppose that c < a, b < d, i.e. we have a coordination game. Then, the mixed-strategy equilibria does not correspond to a stable configuration in any sense of the word.
Under myopic best reply, it is still true that n B < n * < n A . However, now A-players switch strategies for n < n A , and B-players for n > n B , which means the dynamics points towards the two monomorphic states. The set {n ∈ Ω / n B < n < n A }, which is essentially a singleton next to n * , is the intersection of both basins of attraction. Hence, n * marks the boundary between both basins of attraction, even if it fails to be absorbing.
Under imitation, A-players switch strategies for n <n and B-players for n >n, i.e. again the dynamics points towards the monomorphic states.
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The staten marks the exact boundary of the two basins of attraction (technically, because of the tie-breaking assumption, it belongs to both, and hence fails to be absorbing). Since it still approaches n * as N grows, this still can be taken to point at the significance of the mixed equilibrium.
Regardless of the complications and technical details which spread from a discrete-time, stochastic, behavior-based dynamics, qualitatively the situation is analogous to a well-behaved, continuous-time, deterministic system. For a 2 × 2 game with two pure-strategy, symmetric equilibria, the mixed equilibrium identifies a repelling point of the dynamics, whereas the two pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In absence of the pure-strategy equilibria, the mixed-strategy one is then globally attracting.
THE GENERAL CASE: MYOPIC BEST REPLY
Consider now a general learning process with a single finite population of N agents, i = 1, ..., N interacting in discrete time, t = 1, 2, ..., according to a round-robin tournament, to play an underlying symmetric two-player game with finite strategy space S = {s 1 , ..., s m } and (symmetric) payoff function π :
Notation. Let A be the payoff matrix associated to the payoff function π, and denote by e s a vector of m = |S| coordinates, all of them zero except for a 1 in the position corresponding to strategy s. Notice that Π(s; ω) = e 
Absorbing states
.m. Then, ω is an absorbing state if and only if
Proof. The state ω is absorbing if and only if no agent will change its strategy if given opportunity to revise. Under myopic best reply, this amounts to
Fix s ∈ supp(ω) and s = s. This condition is equivalent to s)+π(s , s ) or, equivalently,
which yields the required condition. 
Suppose the game has a mixed-strategy symmetric equilibrium given by the strategy σ. The condition that makes possible to interpret this strategy exactly as a population profile is:
Condition (INT). There exists a state ω
* = (n 1 , ..., n m ) ∈ Ω such that σ i = ni N for all i = 1, ...m.
Proposition 4.1. Consider any learning process with myopic best reply. If the game has a completely-mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium given by the strategy σ, and assuming (INT), then the corresponding state ω * is absorbing if and only if π(s , s) > π(s, s) ∀ s, s , s = s
i.e. each pure strategy is a strict worst reply against itself. In particular, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium will never be absorbing if the game has any strict, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If supp(ω) = S and σ describes a Nash equilibrium, then π(s, σ) = π(s , σ) for all s, s ∈ S.
The result follows then from Lemma 4.1. Proposition 4.1 was already established in Oechssler [13, Proposition 1] , where it is noted that a completely mixed profile as above cannot be invaded by a single mutant playing a pure strategy.
BR-focal strategies
In the 2×2 case, we saw how an absorbing state exists for a fixed N except under extreme integer problems, and whenever n * is a well-defined state, it is precisely the absorbing one. This motivates the following definition. In the Hawk and Dove example, only the Nash equilibrium is BR-focal. We confirm now this intuition for general games.
Theorem 4.1. A mixed strategy σ such that {σ(s)} s∈S are rational numbers is frequently absorbing under best reply if and only if (a) (σ, σ) is a Nash Equilibrium of the game. (b) ∀ s ∈ S, if π(s , σ) = π(σ, σ) then π(s , s) > π(s, s) ∀ s ∈ supp(σ).
Proof. "Only if." (a) Let σ be frequently absorbing under best reply, and let s ∈ S be any pure strategy. It is enough to show that π(s , σ) ≤ π(σ, σ). 
Let s ∈ supp(σ). It follows that π(s, σ) = π(σ, σ). Suppose π(s , σ) > π(σ, σ) = π(s, σ). Then, π(s, σ) − π(s , σ) <
The conclusion follows from Lemma 4.1.
A BR-focal strategy corresponds to a Nash equilibrium and, whenever it is possible to reinterpret it as a finite population profile, it turns out to be absorbing in any dynamics based on best reply. Notice again that the profile is not absorbing because of any tie-breaking assumption, but because agents are actually earning strictly more than they would earn if they were to deviate.
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Theorem 4.1 states that a strategy σ is BR-focal if, whenever an s-player faces an alternative s which is just as good as s against σ, the part of the total payoff against σ that he fails to realize because he cannot play against himself (π(s, s) ) is lower than the part of that same payoff that he will fail to realize after switching to s due to the fact that, then, there will be one s-player less (π(s , s) ). There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, given by the mixed strategy σ = ( ). The payoff of any pure strategy against σ is equal to 1. Let N = 3 · k, k ≥ 0, and consider the state ω = (k, k, k). The average payoff of any pure strategy player is given by
The lack of an interaction yielding payoff zero makes the average payoff strictly greater than zero. That is, strategy A is disadvantageous against itself (payoff 0), but this effect is reduced by the fact that an agent does not play against himself. Consider now, for example, an A-player deciding whether to switch to strategy B. Strategy B is very advantageous against A (payoff 2). If the other agents remain with their strategies, his average payoff would be
The fact that the agent himself was originally an A-player reduces the potential advantage of a switch to strategy B.
Analogously, the average payoff if an A-player would switch to C would be equal to 1. Hence, the strict (myopic) best reply of an A-player is to keep playing A.
The previous theorem shows that σ is frequently absorbing. It turns out, though, that σ is also an ESS.
Oechssler [13] proves that, for 3 × 3 games with a unique, completely mixed equilibrium, the best reply process (with independent inertia) converges to the corresponding state if and only if said state is absorbing. The next example shows a 4 × 4 game with a completely-mixed BR-focal equilibrium, which corresponds to an absorbing but unstable state in any learning process with myopic best reply. Let N = 4k and ω = (k, k, k, k). Since σ 3 is BR-focal, no agent will deviate under myopic best reply. However, consider state ω = (k −1, k, k + 1, k). The payoffs of an A-player are k + (2k + 1)x, while if he switched to strategy D he would obtain (2k − 1)x + k + 1 > k + (2k + 1)x, that is, the process leads away from ω from states close to it. Qualitatively, the game is similar to a 2 × 2 Coordination Game, where σ 1 , σ 2 correspond to the attracting equilibria and σ 3 to the unstable mixture between them.
Discussion and comparison with ESS
The similarity of Theorem 4.1 and the original definition of "Evolutionarily Stable Strategy" (ESS) is remarkable. An ESS (a concept which makes most sense in the framework of an explicitly infinite population) is a strategy σ such that (a) (σ, σ) is a Nash Equilibrium, and (b) For any mixed strategy σ = σ such that π(σ , σ) = π(σ, σ, it follows that π(σ, σ ) > π(σ , σ ). That is, an ESS requires a Nash equilibrium to be resistant to deviations in the sense that, if agents are indifferent between the ESS and another (mixed) strategy, the ESS performs better against the deviating strategy than itself does.
In contrast, a BR-focal strategy σ must build a Nash equilibrium which is resistant to deviations in the sense that, if agents are indifferent between σ and another (pure) strategy, then the deviating strategy performs better against strategies in the support of σ than each of them does against itself.
This condition arises from the individual, myopic nature of the considered deviations. If the population profile corresponds to σ, the agent is not really facing a mixed strategy σ, because he can not play against himself. That is, his (non-averaged) payoffs are N · π(s, σ) − π(s, s) . Hence, there is a missing term π(s, s) in his payoffs. If the strategy s performs badly against itself, this disadvantage will be reduced by the agent's perception of himself being an s-player (recall Example 4.1).
If the agent were to switch to s , because of his own strategy change, the profile in the population does not correspond to σ anymore. His (nonaveraged) payoffs after the deviation are N ·π(s , σ)−π (s , s) . If the strategy s is advantageous against S, the term π(s , s) represents the reduction of this advantage due to the fact that the agent was an s-player himself.
The condition for a strategy σ to be BR-focal is a comparison of these two payoff reductions. If s is just as good as s against σ, the loss of the possible disadvantage of s against itself (π(s, s)) must be offset by the reduction in the advantage of s against s (π(s , s) ). This game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium given by σ = ( This is a feature of the finite-population framework and the individualbehavior approach. The payoff x is unreachable for an agent which plans to deviate from a profile where strategy C is not present. However, it plays a role for an ESS, where deviations take the form of a small proportion of mutants (which will also play among themselves).
Notice that, in Example 4.2, the completely mixed strategy σ 3 is frequently absorbing but not an ESS. This game has also a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium given by σ = ( Again, the payoff x is unreachable for an agent which plans to deviate from a profile where strategy C is not present. However, in the rationale behind an ESS, a small proportion of mutants will also play among themselves and obtain it. While in the previous example (if x > 1) this was to the mutants' advantage, in this case (if x < 1) it plays against them.
Example 4.5. ESS does not imply frequently absorbing (2) . Consider the following case of a "Rock-Scissors-Paper" game. 
THE GENERAL CASE: IMITATION
Consider now a general learning process as in the previous section, but endow agents with imitative rules rather than myopic best reply ones.
No absorbing states
The first negative result (for mixed strategy profiles) is that we have to give up the hope of having absorbing states. Proof. In any non-monomorphic state ω , there would be different strategies in its support. Let
Then, there is positive probability that an agent not playing s gets the opportunity to revise and imitates s, that is, P (ω , m(ω , s , s) > 0 for all s ∈ supp(ω ), and hence ω is not absorbing.
Under independent inertia, there is positive probability that all agents not playing s get the opportunity to revise and imitate s. It follows that there is positive probability for a transition from any ω ∈ Ω to a monomorphic state, and hence any non-monomorphic state is in a transient class.
Two observations follow from the previous lemma. First, independent inertia coupled with imitation is too quick a dynamics for a mixed profile to be sustainable in any sense. Such extreme dynamics can only give rise to monomorphic states.
Second, as we learned in the 2 × 2 case, for dynamics with slower adjustment this does not preclude mixed profiles from being stable in an appropriately defined sense. However, this will never mean an absorbing state, but, at best, a focal point within a (maybe narrow) non-singleton recurrent communication class.
We will try to pursue the (encouraging) intuition we developed for the 2 × 2 case and see whether it extends to more general games or not. That is, we try to characterize Nash equilibria which are limits of sequences of mixed strategies which, if reinterpreted as population profiles (barring integer problems), turn out to identify rest points (or, at least, narrow recurrent classes) of imitation dynamics.
Imitation-absorbing states
The first intuition concerns the existence (for each population size N )of a focal point (n in 2 × 2 games) such that all strategies in its support give the same payoff in the round-robin tournament, and such that it approaches a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as the population size grows to infinity. We use a fixed-point argument to show its existence in general games. In the next theorem, we abuse notation writing π(x, y) to denote x T · A · y, even if x, y are not mixed strategies but arbitrary vectors. N such that π(s, N · σ N − e s ) = π(s , N · σ N − e s ) ∀ s, s ∈ supp(σ N )  and supp(σ N ) ⊆ supp(σ) . Moreover, if (σ * , σ * ) is the only symmetric Nash equilibrium on the restricted game with strategy space supp(σ
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that supp(σ * ) = S. If not, it suffices to define a new game by restricting the previous one to the sub-strategy space supp(σ * ). Let ∆ be the space of mixed strategies. Given any mixed strategy σ, define
Extend this function linearly to ∆ by 
We have shown existence of the sequence {σ N }. Since this is a sequence of real vectors in a compact set, it has a convergent subsequence {σ N k }. Let σ 1 be its limit. Then, for all k,
and taking limits when k → ∞,
which can be rewritten simply as
and means that σ 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
We have proven that every convergent subsequence of {σ N } converges to a Nash equilibrium. If the game has only one Nash equilibrium, (σ * , σ * ), then every convergent subsequence converges to σ * , which implies that (σ N , σ N ) is actually an approximation through Nash equilibria of perturbed games as the perturbation goes to zero. It is well-known that the Nash correspondence (mapping perturbations to sets of equilibria) is not lower hemicontinuous, and hence, in principle there might be (non-generic) Nash equilibria of the original game that cannot be approximated by any such sequence.
The mixed strategies σ N are the candidates as focal points of imitation dynamics for any fixed population size. Suppose, analogously to previous (INT) assumptions, that N · σ N is actually a state in the dynamics with N agents. In the 2 × 2 case, we saw that the set {n − 1,n,n + 1} is then a recurrent communication class. The analogous requirement (admittedly quite demanding) would be that, in case an agent drifts away from his strategy under the profile σ N , in the resulting profile the strategy that the agent has left is the one which now gives the maximal payoff (provided this strategy has not disappeared, i.e. there were more than one agent playing it), prompting a return to the previous profile. This gives rise to the following definition. assumes that ω(s) > 1 ∀ s ∈ supp(ω) , that is, no strategy can disappear after a single deviation. Since σ N approaches a mixed strategy equilibrium, and provided N · σ N is a state, this will be true except for small population sizes. 
Proof. Note that P (ω, ω ) > 0 ∀ ω ∈ N 1 (ω) by (a) in the definition of imitation-absorbing state. Moreover, with non-simultaneous learning it follows that P (ω, ω ) = 0 ∀ ω / ∈ N 1 (ω). Consider now a state ω = m(ω, s, s ). By (b) in the definition of imitation-absorbing state, it follows that the strategy giving maximum payoff in ω is s. Suppose P (ω , ω ) > 0. By non-simultaneous learning, we have that ω = m(ω , s , s) for some s ∈ supp(ω).
We have proved that
It remains to show that states in ∈ N 1 (ω) communicate. Note that, for all ω = m(ω, s, s ), P (ω , ω) > 0 and P (ω, ω ) > 0. By transitivity, it follows that N 1 (ω) is a recurrent communication class. Let σ be a mixed strategy. An imitation sequence approaching σ is a pair ({N k }, {σ k }) such that {N k } is an strictly increasing sequence of population sizes and {σ k } is a sequence of mixed strategies {σ k } such that
An imitation sequence approaching σ is non-degenerate if there exists at least one σ N k such that supp(σ N k ) = supp(σ) and N k · σ N k is a well-defined state of the dynamics with N k agents.
Degeneracy may appear because of integer problems, e.g. games with some rational and some irrational payoffs. (ii) For all imitation sequences ({N k }, {σ k }) approaching σ, there existŝ N such that, whenever N k >N and N k · σ k is a well-defined state of the dynamics with N k agents, then it is an imitation-absorbing state.
The strategy is non-degenerate if the sequence in (i) is non-degenerate. Proof. Without loss of generality, restrict the strategy space to supp(σ). (a) Let σ be frequently imitation-absorbing, and let ({N k }, {σ k }) be an imitation sequence approaching σ. By (i), This game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium given by the mixed strategy σ = ( 
This sequence does indeed approach σ and, moreover, N · σ N is a welldefined state of the dynamics with N agents whenever N is odd. Let, thus, N = 2k + 1 with k > 2 and ω = (k, k + 1, 0). This state is imitation-absorbing. We check now the dynamic consequences of this fact.
In state ω, both A and B yield a payoff of 2k. If an A-player imitates B, the process moves to m(ω, A, B) = (k − 1, k + 2, 0). In the new state, strategies A and B earn respectively 2k and 2k − 2, and hence the only possible transition will happen when a B-player imitates A and the process goes back to ω. Analogously, if a B-player imitates A, the process moves to state m(ω, B, A) = (k +1, k, 0). Strategies A and B earn then 2k and 2k +2 respectively, and hence the only positive-probability transition occurs when an A-player imitates B and the process goes back to ω.
Comparison of BR-focal and Imitation-focal strategies
First, we prove the intuition we obtained in the 2 × 2 case and show that for this class of games, both concepts are equivalent. Conversely
and it follows that strategy A weakly dominates strategy B, which contradicts the existence of a (completely) mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium. Now we show that for completely mixed strategies, Imitation-focal strategies are always BR-focal strategies, i.e. the former are a sharper refinement of Nash equilibria that collects stability properties both from imitation and best-reply dynamics. In summary, strategy s (weakly) dominates strategy s . This is a contradiction with the fact that both are in the support of the completely mixed strategy σ, and (σ, σ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5. 2. It follows from this result and Proposition 4.1 that if σ is an Imitation-focal strategy, the game restricted to the strategy subspace supp σ cannot have any symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
The requirement of σ to be completely mixed is necessary. Since, under imitation dynamics, anything not in the support of the current state is irrelevant, it is easy to see that an imitation-focal strategy might easily fail to be BR-focal if the strategies outside its support are attractive enough. The mixed strategy σ = ( This game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, given by the mixed strategy σ = ( m(ω, A, B) = (k−1, k+1, 3k) , with payoffs 4k+1, 4k−1, 4k+2 respectively for strategies A, B, and C. Hence, the maximum payoff corresponds now to strategy C and the process may drift further away from σ. Since an state ω is imitation-absorbing only if N 1 (ω) is recurrent, we see that (k, k, 3k) is never imitation-absorbing.
CONCLUSION
This paper identifies two concepts, called BR-focal and Imitation-focal strategies. Summarizing the analysis, these concepts could be roughly defined as follows.
A BR-focal strategy is a mixed strategy which corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium and such that, whenever (barring integer problems) it is re-interpreted as a (finite) population profile of agents playing pure strategies, it turns out to be an absorbing state of any discrete-time, stochastic dynamics where agents play the underlying game in a roundrobin tournament and update their strategies according to myopic best reply.
An imitation-focal strategy is a mixed strategy which corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium (of the game where the strategy space is restricted to be its support) such that it is the limit of a sequence of strategies indexed by population size, which, if (barring integer problems) re-interpreted as population profiles, turn out to be in a narrow recurrent communication class of the finite-population, discrete-time dynamics where agents play the underlying game in a round-robin tournament, update their strategies according to imitation rules, and adjustment is non-simultaneous.
In spite of the technical complexities which make the analysis proceed in this way, both BR-focal and imitation-focal strategies can be characterized through conditions which depend only on the payoff matrix and not on any population size. It turns out that both concepts coincide in the case of 2 × 2 games, and that every imitation-focal, completely mixed strategy is also BR-focal, but the reverse implication fails for general games.
Technical difficulties associated both to finite population and discrete time make necessary a careful consideration of the appropriate "rest point" notion, and integer problems force to keep track of when mixed strategies can be reinterpreted as population profiles. The analysis, however, shows that the above mentioned refinements of symmetric, mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can be considered rest points of finite-population, discrete-time dynamics in a meaningful, well-defined sense.
It is specially important to notice that the mixed strategy equilibria studied in this paper exhibit what we could call stability properties without resorting either to continuous-time approximations or to explicitly infinite populations, at the price of, e.g., tracing approximations and facing integer problems. In the words of John Nash [12, p.33] , "The populations need not be large if the assumptions still hold. [...] Actually, of course, we can only expect some sort of approximate equilibrium, since the information, its utilization, and the stability of the average frequencies will be imperfect."
